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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS DONAHUE,

]

Plaintiff and Appellant,

1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

i

Case No. 920500-CA

vs.
GRACE DONAHUE PARISH,
Defendant and Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Order of the District
Court for the First Judicial District of the State of Utah, in
and for Cache County.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction

because the appeal was assigned to it by the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should the terra "proceeds" as used in the Washington
State Decree of Dissolution be interpreted to include the
total amount received by Parish under a Real Estate Purchase
Contract for the sale of the parties' home and is Donahue
entitled to one-half (1/2) of the total amount received by
Parish under the Promissory Note and Contract?

2
Does Utah law permit the Trial Court to apply the
Washington State statutory prejudgment interest of twelve
percent (12%) to a judgment which is rendered and entered in
Utah, or should Utah statutory prejudgment rate of ten percent
(10%) be applied?
Should the Trial Court have allowed Donahue to call Rex
Fuhriman as a witness to explain to the Trial Court his expert
interpretation of the term "proceeds?"
The standard of review concerning each of these issues is
the correctness of the Trial Court's ruling.

See Mountain

Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988)
and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

STATUTES AND RULES
The

following

statutes

and

rules

are

subject

interpretation by this Court:
Section 15-1-1(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953):
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract
specify a different rate of interest, the legal
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action shall be ten
percent (10%) per annum.
19.52.010 (1), Revised Code of Washington:
(1) Every loan or forbearance of money, goods,
or thing in action shall bear interest at the rate
of twelve percent per annum where no different rate
is agreed to in writing between the parties:
Provided,
That with regard to any transaction
heretofore or hereafter entered into subject to
this section, if an agreement in writing between
the parties evidencing such transaction provides
for the payment of money at the end of an agreed
period of time or in installments over an agreed

to
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period of time, then such agreement shall
constitute a writing for purposes of this section
and satisfy the requirements thereof.
The
discounting of commercial paper, where the borrower
makes himself liable as maker, guarantor, or
indorser, shall be considered as a loan for the
purposes of this chapter.

STATEMENT OF CASE
NATURE AND COURSE OF THE CASE
Thomas Donahue, Plaintiff and Appellant, brought an
action against Grace Parish, Defendant and Appellee, for
fraud, declaratory judgment and division of proceeds from the
sale of the parties' home in Logan, Utah. Donahue and Parish
were divorced in Washington on October 20, 1980. The Decree
of Dissolution divided several properties of the parties
located in Cache County, Utah.

Donahue's actions against

Parish for fraud and declaratory judgment were dismissed on
summary judgment by the District Court.

Donahue's claim for

the division of proceeds from the sale of the Logan home was
reserved for trial. Parish counterclaimed for unpaid alimony
and a trial was held in the First Judicial District Court,
Cache County, Utah on December 17, 1991.
The Trial Court determined that the "proceeds" as set
forth in the Washington State Decree of Dissolution meant the
purchase price on the date the house in Logan, Utah was sold
and did not include the interest income on the sale proceeds
pursuant to the Real Estate Contract.

The Trial Court also

ruled that the Washington State statute concerning prejudgment
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interest of twelve percent (12%) applied and not the Utah
State prejudgment

rate of ten percent

(10%) towards any

judgment of Parish against Donahue for unpaid alimony.

The

Trial Court refused to allow Rex Fuhriman to testify at the
trial to explain his interpretation of the term "proceeds."
Consequently, Donahue filed the instant appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Donahue and Parish were married to each other on or about
October 4, 1952.

In 1969, the parties acquired a house in

Logan, Utah in which they resided until 1980.

In 1980, the

parties moved to the State of Washington; however, they did
not sell their home in Logan, Utah, until June 30, 1985.
(Record at 85.)
In 1980, Parish filed for divorce in the Superior Court
in Washington for King County.

Parish was represented by an

attorney in the divorce action but Donahue was not.

The

parties were divorced on October 20, 1980 pursuant to a Decree
of Dissolution. Parish was granted a default divorce against
Donahue.

(Record at 10.)

Concerning the parties' house in Logan, Utah, the Decree
of Dissolution provided that it was awarded to Parish under
the following conditions and restrictions:
B, The home located in Logan, Utah, which
home should be sold and after payment of closing
costs and underlying mortgage payment, the proceeds
divided
equally
between
Petitioner
(Defendant/Appellee)
and
Respondent
(Plaintiff/Appellant).
Each party should be
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required to bear any capital gains that may be
occasioned proportionately with the respective
proceeds that each has paid and further that
Respondent is to pay all taxes owing, pertaining to
said property, up to the date of the closing of the
sale.
See copy of the Decree of Dissolution which is attached hereto
in the Addendum and was Exhibit 1 at the trial on December 17,
1991.
On page 2 of the Decree of Dissolution, Donahue was
awarded as his sole and separate property as follows:
C. An equal share in the proceeds of the home
located in Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions
as heretofore set forth.
See copy of the Decree of Dissolution which is attached in the
Addendum hereto.
On June 30, 1985, the house in Logan, Utah was sold on a
Real Estate Contract. (Record at 85.)

The total purchase

price was $68,000.00. (Record at 15.)

The Contract was

entered into between the Purchaser and Parish only. See Real
Estate Contract which was Exhibit 3.

Under the Contract,

Parish received $15,000.00 as a down payment on June 30, 1985
from which closing costs and fees were subtracted in the
amount

of

$1,559.26

$13,440.74.

for

a

total

net

down

payment

of

(Record at 20.)

The remaining indebtedness of $53,000.00 was to bear
interest at ten percent

(10%) per annum and to be paid

pursuant to a Promissory Note which is due in full on August
1, 2000.

(Record at 15.)

A copy of the Promissory Note and
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Real Estate Contract were Trial Exhibits 2 and 3, respectfully
at the trial on December 17, 1991.
The Real Estate Contract and Promissory Note requires
that Parish receive from the Buyers a monthly payment of
$515.81, which she has received since August 1, 1985 and a
larger payment of $5,250.00 was received by Parish on January
1, 1986.

(Record at 15 and 23.)

At the time of the trial of

this matter in December, 1991, Parish had received seventyeight (78) monthly payments and the January 1, 1986 payment of
$5,250.00 for a total amount of payments received by Parish of
$45,483.18. When the payments through December 17, 1991 were
added

together with

the net down payment

to Parish of

$13,440.74, Parish had received $58,923.74 at the time of
trial in December, 1991. (Record at 23.)
Donahue has not received any portion of the down paym€*nt
or monthly payments under the Real Estate Contract.

(Record

at 20.) All of the down payment and monthly payments from the
sale of the home have been received by Parish.

(Record at

21.)
The total amount of principal and interest to be paid by
the

Purchaser

to

Parish

under

the

Promissory

Note

is

$114,820.94.
The Decree of Dissolution provided that Donahue was to
pay alimony to Parish in the amount of $860.00 per month which
was to terminate upon Parish's remarriage or death. (Record at
24.)

See copy of Decree of Dissolution attached to the
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Addendum hereto.

Donahue paid some alimony to Parish;

however, he was not current in his alimony obligation to
Parish. Exhibit 4 of Trial Record shows the claimed payments
of

Donahue

to Parish.

Donahue claimed

$33,655.00 in alimony at the trial.

he owed Parish

(Record at 41.)

Parish

introduced evidence that Donahue had failed to make alimony
payments with interest at twelve percent (12%) in the amount
of $50,079.02.

See Exhibit 15 of Trial Record.

Parish remarried on March
alimony obligation of Donahue.

19, 1986 terminating the
(Record at 92.)

Donahue filed an Amended Complaint which sought the
Court's determination of the term "proceeds" from the sale of
the home and Parish counterclaimed for alimony arrears.

A

trial was held on December 17, 1991 and at the trial the
District Court Judge accepted Parish's argument that the share
of Donahue of the Real Estate Contract as of the date of the
sale on June 30, 1985 was $66,389.95 which would entitle
Donahue to one-half (1/2) of that or $33,192.48.

The Trial

Court found that alimony arrearages with interest at twelve
percent (12%) were $50,079.02 resulting in a judgment against
Donahue of $16,886.84.

(Record at 140 and 141.)

The Trial

Court terminated any right, title and interest that Donahue
had in the home and awarded the home to Parish together with
a judgment in the amount of $16,886.54.

(Record at 146.)

See copy of Court's Order which is attached in the Addendum
hereto.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Washington State Decree of Dissolution provides that
the "proceeds from the sale of the home" are to be divided
between Donahue and Parish. Donahue submits to the Court that
proceeds are the total amount that is received under the Real
Estate Contract and Promissory Note, which would include all
of the principal and interest for the full term of the Real
Estate Contract. Donahue should receive one-half (1/2) of the
total amount received under the Real Estate Contract.
The judgment which was entered against Donahue in favor
or Parish for unpaid alimony accrued interest as ordered by
the Trial Court at the Washington State prejudgment interest
rate of twelve percent (12%). This is a Utah judgment and the
legal rate of interest for judgments rendered in the State of
Utah should be the statutory Utah rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum pursuant

o Utah Code Annotated, 515-1-1 and not

according to the Wasnington State statute.
The Trial Court wrongfully refused to allow Mr. Rex
Fuhriman to testify at the trial to explain his interpretation
of the term "proceeds" as an expert witness.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TERM "PROCEEDS OF SALE" AS SET FORTH IN THE
WASHIK 'TON STATE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION SHOULD BE
INTERI 2TED TO INCLUDE THE FULL AMOUNT OF MONEYS
ACTUA1 .Y RECEIVED BY PARISH, AND DONAHUE IS
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE AN OFFSET AGAINST THE UNPAID
ALIMONY FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED BY PARISH UP
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TO THE DATE OF TRIAL AND IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE HIS
ONE-HALF OF ANY REMAINING PROCEEDS WHICH SHOULD BE
APPLIED AGAINST THE UNPAID ALIMONY BALANCE.
The Washington State Superior Court ordered in Paragraph
B of the Decree of Dissolution that the parties' home in
Logan, Utah was to be sold and "... after payment of closing
costs and underlying mortgage payment, the proceeds divided
equally between Petitioner and Respondent."

Paragraph B of

the Decree of Dissolution further provided that each party was
to be responsible for any capital gains "... that may be
occasioned proportionately with respect to the respective
proceeds that each has paid and further that Respondent is to
pay all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the
date of closing of sale."

See copy of Decree of Dissolution

which was Exhibit 1 in trial record.

On page 2 of the Decree

of Dissolution, the Court awards property to Donahue and
states in paragraph C as follows:

"An equal share in the

proceeds of the home located in Logan, Utah, on the terms and
conditions as heretofore set forth."
Therefore, Donahue was to receive under the Decree of
Dissolution one-half (1/2) of the proceeds from the sale of
the home located in Logan, Utah.

The issue facing the Trial

Court was the definition of the term "proceeds."

The Trial

Court found that the term "proceeds" means the total amount of
the sale on the date of sale of the home minus any closing
costs. The Trial Court would not include the total amount of
money received by the parties for the sale of the home over
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the term of the Real Estate Contract.

Order dated March 9,

1992, paragraphs 5 and 7.
The Washington State Decree of Dissolution was granted to
Parish as a default divorce.
attorney.

She was represented by an

Donahue was not represented by counsel.

Parish's

attorney prepared the Decree of Dissolution. Any mistakes or
ambiguities contained in the Decree of Dissolution should be
construed against Parish.
Generally,

"proceeds"

are

defined

as

"the

amount

proceeding or accruing from some possession or transaction."
72 Corpus Juris Secundum, Proceeds, page 973. Furthermore# it
is generally held that when the term "proceeds" is implied
with reference to a sale,

"it usually means the entire

proceeds, that is, all that was received from the sale."

72

Corpus Juris Secundum, Proceeds, pages 973-974.
In a Utah case concerning the definition of "proceeds"
involving taxes, the Utah Supreme Court found that the term
"gross proceeds realized" as used in the Utah Code, "means the
total or whole amount in money, or other things of value, that
has been realized or which the owner may receive or take
possession of at his pleasure, or in which he is entitled upon
demand and which accrues to him from the sale or conversion
into money or its equivalent of ores extracted from the mine
or mining claim." United States Smelting, Refining & Min. Co.
v. Haynes, 176 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1947).
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In the case of Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d 1064
(Idaho

1936)/

the

Idaho Supreme Court defined

the word

"proceeds" as used in a contract between two parties.

The

Idaho Supreme Court went on to hold that the definition of the
term "proceeds" depends on the intention of the parties, which
is to be determined by all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances.

Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d at 1069.

Furthermore, the Idaho State Supreme Court went on to set
forth the following definition: "The proceeds of a sale means
the entire proceeds."

Furst & Thomas v. Elliott. 56 P.2d at

1068.
In a divorce case decided in the State of Washington, the
Washington Court of Appeals was required to define the term
"proceeds" where a lien had been granted in favor of a
divorced husband against the sale proceeds of a home which was
awarded to the wife.

The Washington Court of Appeals held

that the husband's lien on the home was limited in its terms
to the proceeds "of any sale, if the home was ever sold." The
Washington Court of Appeals went on to hold that "proceeds of
sale in this context means moneys actually received by the
seller."

Kshensky v. Pioneer Nat. Title Ins. Co.. 592 P.2d

667, 669 (Wash. App. 1979).
Clearly, the law in the State of Utah and from various
Jurisdictions generally provides that the term "proceeds"
means all that is received from the sale.
to a certain date or a certain amount.

It is not limited
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In this case, the house in Logan, Utah was sold on a Real
Estate Contract and Promissory Note.

(See Exhibit 2 of Trial

Record.) The purchase price of the home was $68,000.00, which
was to accrue interest at ten percent (10%) per annum. Parish
received a down payment of $15,000.00 and another payment of
$5,250.00 on January 1, 1986.

The remainder of the unpaid

balance was paid at $515.81 per month beginning August, 1985,
and was to be paid in full on August 1, 2000.

(Record at 15.)

The closing costs for the sale were $1,558.26.
19.)

(Record at

The total proceeds during the term of the Promissory

Note and Real Estate Contract would realize $114,820.94 to
Donahue and Parish.
The Trial Court Judge defined "proceeds" as being the
present value of the sale of the home in June, 1985, which
gave Donahue a setoff of $33,192.48. The Trial Court did not
consider the interest on the monthly payments that had been
made to Parish or the interest and payments that would be made
to her through the term of the Promissory Note until August 1,
2000.

The offset ordered by the Trial Court did not include

the additional payments that Parish had received through the
date of trial on December 17, 1991, and the payments that
Parish was to receive through August 1, 2000.
The Trial Court found that Donahue owed Parish $50,079.02
for unpaid alimony and interest at twelve percent

(12%).

(Record at 140 and 141.) At the trial, evidence was presented
that the total amount of money received by Parish from the
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date of sale to the date of trial was $58,923.74.

Donahue's

and Parish's share of that total amount received would be
$29/461.87.

(Record at 23.)

Therefore, Donahue should have

been given a credit against the alimony arrearages in the
amount of $29,461.87. This is consistent with the definition
of "proceeds" which would be the total amount realized by
Parish as of the date of trial.

Also, Donahue should have

received interest on his share of the amounts that had not
been paid by Parish to Donahue, especially in light of the
fact that the Court awarded interest on the alimony not paid
by Donahue to Parish.
The balance of the payments pursuant to the Promissory
Note and Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the home
from December, 1991 through August, 2000, is $36,506.84. The
District Court should have allowed Donahue to receive one-half
(1/2) of the remaining monthly payments of $515.81 until the
loan balance is paid in full in August, 2000.

This would

allow an offset towards the alimony judgment entered against
Donahue.
By accounting for the total proceeds (i.e. all of the
payments, interest and receipts in this matter) the Trial
Court would have taken into consideration the total amount of
moneys or proceeds received and to be received by the parties
under the Real Estate Contract. An interpretation of the word
"proceeds" in this matter would allow Donahue to receive onehalf (1/2) of the remaining amounts to be paid under the Real
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Estate Contract or, in turn, allow him to have one-half (1/2)
of the remaining amounts applied towards his alimony judgment.
Also, it would take into consideration the possibility of
foreclosure if the purchaser of the home failed to make the
payments.

This is a very real possibility, particularly in

light of the fact that Parish testified at the trial that
payments on the home were four months in arrears.
85.)

(Record at

If the home was taken back because of a default of

payments by the purchasers, then Donahue and Parish would be
able to re-sell the home and receive more gain or income from
the proceeds.
Donahue did not ask the Trial Court to consider the
future value of the Promissory Note against the present value
of the alimony.

Donahue simply requested the Court to

consider and interpret the definition of "proceeds" and enter
a judgment against Donahue for the alimony that was owed after
subtracting the total payments and interest received by Parish
through December, 1991.

Donahue further requested the Court

to allow him to receive one-half (1/2) of the future payments
pursuant to the Real Estate Contract and apply that towards
his alimony judgment.

An interpretation such as this would

comply with the definitions as stated above concerning the
term "proceeds." That is, Mr. Donahue would be given one-half
(1/2) of the proceeds of all that was received from the sale
of the home.
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Donahue requests this Court to remand the issue of
proceeds

to

the

Trial

Court

for

a

determination

that

"proceeds" means all of moneys received by Parish under the
Real Estate Contract and not just one-half (1/2) of the net
sales price on the date of sale.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGFULLY APPLIED WASHINGTON
STATE STATUTORY PREJUDGMENT RATE OF TWELVE PERCENT
(12%) WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE UTAH STATE
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST RATE OF TEN PERCENT (10%)
AGAINST ANY JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DONAHUE.
Parish

filed

with

the

Trial

Court

a

counterclaim

requesting a judgment against Donahue for alimony. The Trial
Court awarded a judgment against Donahue for unpaid alimony in
the amount of $16,886.54.

The judgment included an award of

prejudgment interest on the unpaid alimony at the Washington
State statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) pursuant to the
Revised Code of Washington 19.52.010.
Counsel

for Donahue objected

See Trial Exhibit 10.

to the application

of the

Washington statutory prejudgment rate and argued that the Utah
statutory prejudgment rate of ten percent (10%) should be
applied.

(Record at 80.)

Utah Code Annotated S15-l-l(2) provides as follows:
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract
specify a different rate of interest, the legal
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action shall be ten
percent (10%) per annum.
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Therefore, unless parties to a contract agree to a different
rate, the legal rate for prejudgment interest in Utah is ten
percent (10%) per annum.

Trial courts are required as a

matter of law to award the statutorily mandated prejudgment
rates.

Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Industries. 802 P.2d

779, 782 (Utah App. 1990).
Other states have held that the law of the state entering
the

judgment

controls the issue of prejudgment

interest

awarded. See Prospero Associates v. Redactron Corp., 682 P.2d
1193, 1200 (Colo. App. 1983); In Re Air Crash Disaster at
Stapleton Intern., 720 F. Supp. 1505, 1530 (D. Colo. 1989).
The general rule is that the law of the forum applying the
interest, determines the amount of interest unless it is
expressly shown that a different law governs and in the case
of doubt, the law of the forum is preferred.

Gray v. Amoco

Production Co., 564 P.2d 579, 583 (Kan. App. 1977).
In this case, the Trial Court applied the Washington
statutory prejudgment rate of twelve perceat (12%) to the Utah
judgment for unpaid alimony.

The Utah statutory prejudgment

rate of ten percent (10%) should have been applied since this
is a Utah judgment. Utah is the forum rendering the judgment
and the laws of the State of Utah were applied in determining
whether alimony was owed and the amount of alimony owed.
Therefore, the Trial Court improperly applied the prejudgment
legal rate from Washington of twelve percent (12%), when it
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should have applied the prejudgment interest rate of ten
percent (10%) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated S 15-1-1(2).
Donahue requests the Court to remand this matter to the
Trial Court for a determination of the amount of interest on
the alimony judgment at the prejudgment interest rate of ten
percent (10%) and not the Washington statutory rate of twelve
percent (12%).

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGFULLY REFUSED TO ALLOW MR. REX
FUHRIMAN TO TESTIFY AT THE TRIAL TO EXPLAIN HIS
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "PROCEEDS" AS AN EXPERT
WITNESS.
At the trial, Donahue attempted to call Mr. Rex Fuhriman
as a rebuttal witness.

(Record at 125.)

Parish's attorney

objected to Mr. Fuhriman being called as a surprise witness.
Donahue's attorney explained to the Trial Judge that Mr.
Fuhriman

was

being

called

to

assist

interpretation of the term "proceeds."

the

Court

in the

(Record at 126.) Mr.

Fuhriman was represented to the Court as a certified and
licensed real estate broker.

(Record at 126.)

The Trial

Judge indicated that he was familiar with Mr. Fuhriman's
professional credentials.

(Record at 127.)

The Trial Court

went on to rule that it was not concerned with Mr. Fuhriman
being a surprise witness but went on to state as follows:
However, the term "proceeds" as used in the Decree
of Divorce is in fact that, a term used in the
Decree of Divorce. And how it may or may not be
used in the real estate world is not material.
Objection is sustained.
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Donahue submits to this Court that the Trial Court
wrongfully refused to allow Mr. Rex Fuhriman to testify at the
trial as an expert witness to assist the Court

in its

interpretation of the term "proceeds."
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as
follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training
or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trior of fact.
At trial, Donahue was simply calling an expert who had
specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact in the
determination of a fact in issue, which was, the definition of
"proceeds." Mr. Fuhriman was recognized by the Court to have
the professional credentials as a real estate broker. (Record
at 127.) Therefore, he had the technical or other specialized
knowledge which would have assisted the Court as required by
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Mr. Fuhriman's testimony as an expert was intended to be
introduced to assist the Court in the determination of the
ultimate issue of the definition of "proceeds."

Opinion

testimony of an expert witness is not rendered inadmissible by
the fact that it may have embraced the ultimate factual issue
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to be decided by the trier of fact.
Co.,

622 P.2d

1168, 1173

(Utah

Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft &
1980).

Therefore, Mr.

Fuhriman's testimony cannot be excluded due to the fact that
it was to be used to determine the ultimate issue of the
definition of "proceeds."
Donahue submits to this Court that the testimony of Mr.
Fuhriman was admissible and would assist the Court in its
interpretation of the word "proceeds."

He was clearly an

expert in the real estate area and the Court recognized his
professional credentials. The technical or other specialized
knowledge of Mr. Fuhriman would have assisted the Court in its
determination of the term "proceeds."

Thus, the Trial Court

wrongfully excluded the testimony of Mr. Rex Fuhriman to
explain his interpretation of the term "proceeds" as an expert
witness.

Donahue requests that the Court remand this matter

to the Trial Court for another trial to allow the testimony of
Mr. Rex Fuhriman as an expert to assist the Court in its
interpretation of the term "proceeds."

CONCLUSION
Donahue

submits

that

the

Trial

Court

improperly

interpreted the term "proceeds" as set forth in the Washington
State Decree of Dissolution.

The term should be interpreted

by this Court to include all of the monies actually received
by Parish and all of the monies that she will receive for the
full term of the Real Estate Contract. Donahue is entitled to
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receive an offset against the unpaid alimony for the total
amount received by Parish up to the date of trial and he is
entitled to receive his one-half

(1/2) of any remaining

proceeds which should be applied against the unpaid alimony
balance.
Donahue submits that the Trial Court improperly applied
the Washington State statutory rate of twelve percent (12%) to
the judgment for unpaid alimony against Donahue.

The Trial

Court should have applied the Utah State statutory prejudgment
rate of ten percent (10%) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 15-1-1(2).
Donahue submits that the Trial Court improperly excluded
the testimony of Mr. Rex Fuhriman, who was a qualified expert.
Mr. Fuhriman's testimony would have assisted the Trial Court
in its interpretation of the term "proceeds" and the Trial
Court should have allowed Mr. Fuhriman to testify pursuant to
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Donahue respectfully requests this Court to rule in his
favor on the issues raised in this appeal and reverse the
decision of the Trial Court and remand this action to the
District Court for a further determination of the issues
presented herein.
DATED this ^^"~~day of October, 1992.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

/Thomas L. Willmore
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and exact
copies

of

the

foregoing

Brief

of

Appellant

to

Defendant/Appellee's attorney, C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. at
Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84102,

TLW/div/donahue.bri
N-3887

Utah, this £-£J

day of October, 1992.

ADDENDUM
1.
Decree of Dissolution of October 20, 1980, from
the Superior Court of Washington for King County.
2.
1992.

Trial Court' s Order and Findings dated March 9,

RECEIVED
2 II

OCT 2 0 1980

3 II

KING COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT CLERK'S OFFICE

4

5 II

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUMTY

6

In Re the Marriage of

7

GRACE DONOHUE,

8

Petitioner,

9

and

10

NO.

80-3-04990-2

DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

THOMAS J. DONOHUE,

11

Respondent.

12
13

THIS MATTER having come on duly and regularly before the

14

undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled court, on the

15

date last shown below, the petitioner being represented by her

16

counselor of law, H. Michael Fields of Anderson & Fields Inc., P.S,

17

and respondent having failed to appear, although having been

18

duly and personally served and the court being otherwise fully

19

advised in the premises, having made its Findings of Face and

20

Conclusions, now, therefore, it is hereby

21

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the marriage of the

22

parties be and is hereby dissolved.

It is further

23

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the wife is awarded as

24

her sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in

2-

the husband, the following:

26

A, Thirteen acres located located in Logan, Utah;

27 ]!

B. The home located in Logan,Utah, which home should be

28

sold and after payment of closing costs and underlying mortgage

29

payment, the proceeds divided equally between petitioner and

30.

respondent. Each party should be required to bear any capital

31

gains that may be occasioned proportionally with the respective

32

proceeds that each is paid and further that respondent is co pay
Decree of .-Dissolucicm
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1

all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date of

2

closing of said sale,
C.

3

All personalty in her possession and/or under her

4

respective control, including bank accounts in her name.

5

further

6

It is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that husband is awarded as

7

his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in

8

the wife, the following:

9
LO
11
.2
3
4

A.

All personalty in his possession and or under his

respective control, icnluding bank accounts in his name;
B.

All employment benefits which he may be entitled to

through his employment;
C.

An equal share in the proceeds of the home located in

Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as heretofore set forth.
It is further

5
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both parties are awarded

6
the joint legal custody of Cody, with the primary residence for

7
Cody being provided by father/respondent,with unlimited rights of

8
visitation awarded to the mother.

It is further

9
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent be and is

0
hereby required to absorb the sole financial responsibility for

1
the support of Cody and to pay all college expenses, including

2
room and board,tuition, books, lab fees, and transportation, if

3
4
5
5
7
$
)

Cody enrolls in a post-high school institution of higher learning
or vocational institution to terminate at age twenty-two or attain
ment of a basic degree, whichever is first to occur.

It is further]

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent is to pay
to petitioner the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance
to terminate only upon p e t i t i o n ^ ^ g e m a c r i a g e or death.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

day of September, 1980.

)
I

Presented by:

JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER

>
of ANDERSON 6c FIELDS INC., P.S.
Attorneys for Petitioner
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. #1466
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-4145
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS DONAHUE,
Plaintiff,

v.
GRACE (DONAHUE) PARISH,
Defendant.

)
;»

ORDER

|

Civil NO. 870026212 DC

]I

Judge Gordon J. Low

;

This matter came on for trial on December 17, 1991, before
the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge presiding.
The
Defendant was present and represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.,
and the Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L.
Willmore. That prior to the commencement of the proceedings, both
parties waived any objections they may have to having the Honorable
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, preside at these proceedings,
including the fact that the Court had previously represented the
Plaintiff as his attorney some years ago.
That the Plaintiff was called and testified, and the
Defendant was called and testified, and various exhibits were
offered and received by the Court, and after the argument of
counsel and after due deliberation, the Court hereby

FINDS as follows:
1.
That the interest rate 12% per annum shall apply to
all alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed the Defendant in this
case pursuant to either Utah law or Washington law.
2.
That the alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed
to the Defendant as of the date of the sale of the Logan home, once
owned by the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than the one-half
(*5) of the net eguity which was to be awarded to the Plaintiff as
set forth in Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of Dissolution.
That as of said date, the balance owing after the one-half (h)
equity in the home is deducted for alimony arrearages was
$9,322.83.
3.
That the alimony arrearages owing from the Plaintiff
to the Defendant as of February 28, 1986, the date that alimony
payments ceased when offset against the equity of the home and the
payments received on the Logan home, left a balance owing to the
Defendant after the offset of $16,886.54.
4.
That if the alimony arrearages were to be calculated
against the offset in the equity in the home up to the date of
trial, December 17, 1991, the amount of the alimony arrearage would
be in excess of $16,886.54.
5.
The Court finds that one-half of the sale proceeds
from the Logan home was to be split evenly between the Plaintiff
and Defendant pursuant to Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of
Dissolution and was not done at the time.
6.
The Court finds that the alimony ordered by the
Decree of Dissolution was not paid as set forth in Exhibit 15.
7.
At the time of the sale of the house in 1985 the
Plaintiff would have been entitled to a maximum of $33,000.00, but
at which time he was already in arrears in his alimony to a sum
exceeding that. The best that he could hope for at that point
2

would be that when the house was sold that he either had one-half
of the proceeds from each of the monthly installments or had the
Defendant elected she could have paid in the $33,000.00. Since he
was already in default in excess of that figure, his interest in
the home at that time was liquidated and he was given credit for
the same against the arrearages leaving a balance owed to the
Defendant in the sum of $16,000.00.
8.
The Court finds that all interest of the Plaintiff
is vitiated in the Logan home and all interest or equity in said
home is completely and entirely owned by the Defendant.
9.
The Court finds that Exhibit 15 setting forth the
calculations as to the amount of alimony paid with interest and
the offsets is accurate. The Court finds that at least the sum of
$16,886.54 is owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.
10. The Court finds that the alimony did not abate
pursuant to an alleged agreement by the Plaintiff with the
Defendant for the reason that the Court is not convinced that any
agreement took place, nor was there any Court Order granting such
a modification or abatement. The Court also finds that equity does
not justify any abatement for the Plaintiff.
11. The Court finds that there were attorney's fees
expended by the Defendant in the defense and prosecution of this
matter. However, there was not sufficient evidence to establish
bad faith or the fact that the Plaintiff had filed his nonmeritorious case and thus, no attorney's fees are awarded.
After making said findings the Court
CONCLUDES, ORDERS AND DECREES as follows:
1.
That all right to the interest, equity, or claim
Plaintiff has in the equity in the Logan home once owned by the
parties, and sold June 30, 1985, is vitiated.

3

2.
That Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff
in the amount of $16,886.54, with interest from date of entry at
12%.
3.
Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and
costs.
DATED this
*?
day of ^fht-Lcb
, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

GORDON J. LOW
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
£-+P
day of February,
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following individual:
Thomas L. Willmore
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
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